Credit Scoring and Incentives for Loan Officers in a Principal Agent Model
Year of publication: |
1998
|
---|---|
Authors: | Feess, Eberhard ; Schieble, Michael |
Publisher: |
Frankfurt a. M. : Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
Subject: | Kreditgeschäft | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Kreditwürdigkeit | Signalling | Theorie | delegated expertise | informed principal | limited liability | loan officers | loan origination |
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