Daddy months

Volker Meier; Helmut Rainer

We consider a bargaining model in which husband and wife decide on the allocation of time and disposable income. Since her bargaining power would go down otherwise more strongly, the wife agrees to have a child only if the husband also leaves the labor market for a while. The daddy months subsidy enables the couple to overcome a hold-up problem and thereby improves efficiency. However, the same ruling harms cooperative couples and may also reduce welfare in an endogenous taxation framework.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Meier, Volker ; Rainer, Helmut
Publisher:	München : CESifo
Subject:	fertility \| bargaining \| family policy \| labor supply \| Fertilität \| Fertility \| Familienpolitik \| Family policy \| Arbeitsangebot \| Labour supply \| Familienökonomik \| Family economics \| Theorie \| Theory

Extent:	Online-Ressource ([1], 20 S.)
Series:	CESifo working papers. - München : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 2364-1428, ZDB-ID 2065232-X. - Vol. 5033
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzung: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/105109 [Handle]
Classification:	D13 - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation ; H21 - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation ; J13 - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth ; J18 - Public Policy ; J22 - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010422205