Debt as a Regulatory Constraint

This paper is about using specific investments and secured debt to shield a firm from exploitation by a regulatory authority. It is shown that specific investments and secured debt constrain the regulatory authority in its choice of regime, by providing a credible threat of bankruptcy.

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Year of publication:	1999-03
Authors:	Jebjerg, Lars
Institutions:	Økonomisk Institut, Københavns Universitet
Subject:	regulation \| financial structure \| hold-up problems

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 99-02 16 pages
Classification:	D21 - Firm Behavior ; G38 - Government Policy and Regulation ; L50 - Regulation and Industrial Policy. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005749760