Decentralization as a disincentive for transnational terror? An empirical test

Using panel data for a maximum of 109 countries over the years 1976-2000, we empirically analyze the impact of decentralization on the occurrence of transnational terror. Taking account of the potential simultaneity between terror and decentralization, our results show that expenditure decentralization robustly reduces the number of terror events in a country, while political decentralization has no impact.

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Year of publication:	2007
Authors:	Dreher, Axel ; Fischer, Justina A. V.
Publisher:	Stockholm : Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI)
Subject:	Politische Gewalt \| Dezentralisierung \| Verwaltungsstandort \| Politische Entscheidung \| Panel \| Welt \| Terrorism \| Decentralization \| Democracy

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Series:	SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance ; 686
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	556422724 [GVK] hdl:10419/56274 [Handle]
Classification:	D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances ; H40 - Publicly Provided Goods. General ; H70 - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations. General
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281348