Deception and Incentives:How Dishonesty Undermines Effort Provision

In this paper we show that subtle forms of deceit undermine the effectiveness of incentives.We design an experiment in which the principal has an interest in underreporting the trueperformance difference between the agents in a dynamic tournament...

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Year of publication:	2007-12-01
Authors:	Ederer, Florian ; Fehr, Ernst
Institutions:	Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit <Bonn>
Subject:	Personalpolitik \| Uneigentlichkeit \| Betrug \| Cheating

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Extent:	539648 bytes 53 p. application/pdf
Series:	IZA Discussion Papers IZA Discussion Paper ; No. 3200 (2007)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge ; M12 - Personnel Management ; Personnel management, Personnel planning and Personnel development ; Individual Working Papers, Preprints ; No country specification
Source:	USB Cologne (business full texts)

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005861196