Delegation and Strategic Compensation in Tournaments
This paper considers a two-stage game with two owners and two managers. On the first stage, the owners choose a linear combination of profits and sales as incentives for their managers. On the second stage, the two managers compete in a tournament against each other. In a symmetric equilibrium, both owners induce their managers to maximize profits. In asymmetric equilibria, however, one owner puts a positive weight on sales and the other a negative weight.
Year of publication: |
2000-12
|
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Authors: | Kräkel, Matthias |
Institutions: | University of Bonn, Germany |
Saved in:
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