Demand Adjustment in Coalitional Games

This paper associates a strategic n-person game with a given transferable utility game and studies its Nash equilibria. Strict equilibria in this model characterize those divisions of social surplus that can become conventions in the sense of Young (1993). It is shown that even in relatively simple games various inefficiencies can arise.

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Year of publication:	2004
Authors:	van der Laan, Gerard ; Pruzhansky, Vitaly
Publisher:	Amsterdam and Rotterdam : Tinbergen Institute
Subject:	Spieltheorie \| Koalition \| Verhandlungstheorie \| Theorie \| Aspirations \| bargaining set \| core \| von Neumann-Morgenstern vector \| stable set

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Series:	Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; 04-121/1
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	836103696 [GVK] hdl:10419/86464 [Handle] RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20040121 [RePEc]
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325424