Determinants of Antidumping Policy : Interests, Interactions, and Institutions

The development of antidumping (hereinafter “AD”) policy has been the most frequently used method of contingent protection in the past twenty years. In this study, we conducted an empirical analysis employing a panel dataset of World Trade Organization (hereinafter “WTO”) members from 1995 to 2018 to explore the determinants of AD policy based on the theoretical framework of the three Is (interests, interactions, and institutions) of the international political economy. We found that AD policymaking was a product of the interplay of interests, interactions, and institutions. Regarding interests, we found that the demands of interest groups and political pressure from export- oriented industries counterbalanced AD protection. Regarding interactions, the more WTO members disputing petitions, the stronger the motivation on the part of target countries to retaliate by initiating AD investigations. Regarding institutions, more democratic countries with WTO membership tended to initiate more AD investigations. These findings have implications for industries, national governments, and the WTO in improving the fairness and legitimacy of the global trade governance system