Deterministic mechanisms, the revelation principle, and ex-post constraints
Year of publication: |
2016
|
---|---|
Authors: | Meisner, Vincent ; Jarman, Felix |
Published in: |
Essays in microeconomic theory. - Mannheim. - 2016, p. 58-62
|
Subject: | Öffentlicher Auftrag | Public contract | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Offenbarte Präferenzen | Revealed preferences | Mathematische Optimierung | Mathematical programming | Theorie | Theory |
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