Deterrence works for criminals

Menusch Khadjavi

Criminal law and economics rests on the expectation that deterrence incentives can be employed to reduce crime. Prison survey evidence however suggests that a majority of criminals are biased and may not react to deterrence incentives. This study employs an extra-laboratory experiment in a German prison to test the effectiveness of deterrence. Subjects either face potential punishment when stealing, or they can steal without deterrence. We confirm Gary Becker’s deterrence hypothesis that deterrence works for criminals.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Khadjavi, Menusch
Publisher:	Kiel : Kiel Inst. for the World Economy
Subject:	Crime \| Stealing \| Deterrence \| Prison \| Extra-laboratory experiment \| Artefactual field experiment \| Kriminalpolitik \| Criminal policy \| Kriminalität \| Feldforschung \| Field research \| Experiment \| Strafvollzug \| Penal system \| Kriminalitätsökonomik \| Economics of crime \| Strafe \| Punishment \| Straftäter \| Offenders

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Extent:	Online-Ressource (15 S.) graph. Darst.
Series:	Kiel working paper. - Kiel : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1862-1155, ZDB-ID 2107612-1. - Vol. 1938
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/100076 [Handle]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; C93 - Field Experiments ; K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010384339