Discontinuous Payoffs, Shared Resources, and Games of Fiscal Competition: Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium
We define a class of games with discontinuous payoffs that we call shared resource games and establish a pure strategy Nash equilibrium existence theorem for these games. We then apply this result to a canonical game of fiscal competition for mobile capital. Other applications are also discussed. Our result for the mobile capital game holds for any finite number of regions, permits general preferences over private and public goods, and does not assume that production technologies have a particular functional form, or are identical in all regions, or satisfy the Inada condition at zero. Copyright 2007 Blackwell Publishing, Inc..
Year of publication: |
2007
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Authors: | ROTHSTEIN, PAUL |
Published in: |
Journal of Public Economic Theory. - Association for Public Economic Theory - APET, ISSN 1097-3923. - Vol. 9.2007, 2, p. 335-368
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Publisher: |
Association for Public Economic Theory - APET |
Saved in:
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