Discussion of "Bonus and malus in principal-agent relations with fixed pay and real effort"
Year of publication: |
2008
|
---|---|
Authors: | Stefani, Ulrike |
Other Persons: | Kirstein, Annette (reviewed) |
Published in: |
Schmalenbach business review : sbr. - Cham : Springer, ISSN 1439-2917, ZDB-ID 2000981-1. - Vol. 60.2008, 3, p. 304-318
|
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Arbeitsgruppe | Team |
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