Distrust - The Hidden Cost of Control

This paper shows that a principal's distrust in the voluntary performanceof an agent has a negative impact on the agent's motivation to perform well.

Year of publication:	2004-06-01
Authors:	Falk, Armin ; Kosfeld, Michael
Publisher:	Institut für Empirische Wirtschaftsforschung <Zürich>
Subject:	Agency-Theorie \| Motivation \| Vertrauen \| trust \| Misstrauen \| distrust \| Kontrolle

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Extent:	456704 bytes 25 p. application/pdf
Series:	Universität Zürich - Institut für empirische Wirtschaftsforschung - Publikationen Working Paper ; 2004, 193
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
ISSN:	1424-0459
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; C9 - Design of Experiments ; M5 - Personnel Economics ; Theory of organisation ; Behavioural Economics ; Individual Working Papers, Preprints ; No country specification
Source:	USB Cologne (business full texts)

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005846372