Dividing by demanding: object division through market procedures

We discuss a model, in which two agents may distribute finitely many objects among themselves. The conflict is resolved by means of a market procedure. Depending on the specifications, this procedure serves to implement bargaining solutions such as the discrete Raiffa solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution and the Perles-Maschler solution. The latter is axiomatized using the superadditivity axiom, which in the present context is readily interpreted as resolving a specific source of conflict potential.

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Year of publication:	2004
Authors:	Haake, Claus-Jochen
Publisher:	Bielefeld : Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW)
Subject:	Verhandlungstheorie \| Allgemeines Gleichgewicht \| Object Division \| Market Procedure \| Perles-Maschler Solution

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Series:	Working Papers ; 359
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	572499337 [GVK] hdl:10419/43808 [Handle]
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium ; D51 - Exchange and Production Economies ; D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272592