Do the better insured cause more damage? : testing for asymmetric information in car insurance
Year of publication: |
December 2015
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Authors: | Zavadil, Tibor |
Published in: |
The journal of risk and insurance : the journal of the American Risk and Insurance Association. - Malden, Mass. [u.a] : Blackwell, ISSN 0022-4367, ZDB-ID 410673-8. - Vol. 82.2015, 4, p. 865-889
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Subject: | Kfz-Versicherung | Automobile insurance | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Niederlande | Netherlands |
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