Does Firing a CEO Pay Off?

We examine whether involuntary CEO replacements pay off by improving firm prospects. We find CEO successors' acquisition investments to be associated with significantly higher shareholder gains relative to their predecessors and the average CEO. This improvement in post-turnover acquisition performance appears to be a function of board independence, hedge fund ownership, and the new CEO's relative experience. CEO successors also create sizeable shareholder value by reversing prior investments through asset disposals and discontinuing operations and by employing more efficient investment strategies. Our evidence suggests that firing a CEO pays off

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Year of publication:	2019
Authors:	Alexandridis, George
Other Persons:	Doukas, John A. (contributor) ; Mavis, Christos P. (contributor)
Publisher:	[2019]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Führungskräfte \| Managers \| Managervergütung \| Executive compensation \| Leistungsentgelt \| Performance pay \| Kündigung \| Dismissal \| Corporate Governance \| Corporate governance

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (54 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Financial Management, Vol. 48, pp. 03-43, 2019 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments May 8, 2018 erstellt
Classification:	D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; G30 - Corporate Finance and Governance. General ; G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance ; M51 - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions (hiring, firing, turnover, part-time, temporary workers, seniority issues)
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012899356