Does too much Transparency of Central Banks Prevent Agents from Using their Private Information Efficiently?
Year of publication: |
2007
|
---|---|
Authors: | Lindner, Axel |
Publisher: |
Halle (Saale) : Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH) |
Subject: | Geldpolitik | Staatliche Information | Asymmetrische Information | Wohlfahrtseffekt | Theorie | transparency | private information | common knowledge |
Series: | IWH Discussion Papers ; 16/2007 |
---|---|
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 557273986 [GVK] hdl:10419/29959 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:iwhdps:iwh-16-07 [RePEc] |
Classification: | D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge ; E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies |
Source: |
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