Double Bertrand Competition among Intermediaries

This paper extends Stahl (1988) by modelling a sequential price competition among intermediaries when their expected revenue per sale is affected by consumers’s default. If this revenue is non-monotonie with the asking price, theWalrasian outcome may not be an equilibrium and demand rationing may emerge instead.

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Year of publication:	2003-12
Authors:	Bracoud, Frederique
Institutions:	Centre for Economic Research, School of Economics and Management Studies
Subject:	Bertrand Competition \| Double-sided Competition \| Consumer Default \| Demand Rationing

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Keele Economics Research Papers. - ISSN 1740-231X.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series Keele University, Department of Economics Discussion Papers Number KERP 2003/09 15 pages
Classification:	D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; D45 - Rationing; Licensing ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005636070