Dynamics of Intrahousehold Bargaining

This paper studies the dynamics of bargaining in an intrahousehold context. To explore long-term partner relationships, we analyse bilateral bargaining by considering that spouses take decisions sequentially. We conclude that a greater valuation of the present, rather than the future, for the spouse who takes the second decision, increases the set of possible sustainable agreements, as well as the proportion of time that this agent devotes to a family good.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2008-10
Authors:	Andaluz, Joaquín ; Marcén, Miriam ; Molina, José Alberto
Institutions:	Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Subject:	Stackelberg game \| family bargaining \| family good

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	IZA Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 3757
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium ; J12 - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822573