Effect of separation of duties on firm costs and employee incentives for fraud, theft, and embezzlement

Using a principal-agent model this research examines the efficacy of a fundamental internal control-separation of duties (SOD). The firm is the principal and non-managerial employees are agents. Three cases are studied. The first case is a bench-mark single-agent model. The second case is a SOD model that employs two agents. Finally, an n-agent SOD model is examined.

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Year of publication:	1996
Authors:	Jones, Roberta Ann
Other Persons:	Chandler, John (contributor)
Subject:	Business Administration \| Accounting \| Sociology \| Criminology and Penology

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Type of publication:	Other
Language:	English
Source:	BASE

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009477956