Efficiency Enhancing Taxation in Two-Sided Markets

This paper examines the efficient provision of goods in two-sided markets and characterizes optimal specific and ad-valorem taxes. We show that (i) a monopoly may have too high output compared to the social optimum; (ii) output may be reduced by imposing negative value-added taxes (subsidy) or positive specific taxes

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Year of publication:	[2008]
Authors:	Kind, Hans Jarle
Other Persons:	Köthenbürger, Marko (contributor) ; Schjelderup, Guttorm (contributor)
Publisher:	[2008]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Effizienz \| Efficiency \| Theorie \| Theory \| Wohlfahrtsanalyse \| Welfare analysis \| Monopol \| Monopoly \| Optimale Besteuerung \| Optimal taxation \| Subvention \| Subsidy

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (20 p)
Series:	CESifo Working Paper Series ; No. 2262
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 2008 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.1113024 [DOI]
Classification:	D4 - Market Structure and Pricing ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; H21 - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation ; H22 - Incidence ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012772273