Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in economies with many goods

Takeshi Momi

In this paper, we show that in pure exchange economies where the number of goods equals or exceeds the number of agents, any Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanism always allocates the total endowment to some single agent even if the receivers vary.

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Year of publication:	September 2017
Authors:	Momi, Takeshi
Published in:	Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 12.2017, 3, p. 1267-1306
Subject:	Social choice \| strategy-proofness \| Pareto efficiency \| exchange economy \| Theorie \| Theory \| Neue politische Ökonomie \| Public choice \| Allokation \| Allocation \| Pareto-Optimum \| Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion \| Social welfare function \| Wohlfahrtsökonomik \| Welfare economics \| Effizienz \| Efficiency \| Allokationseffizienz \| Allocative efficiency \| Tauschwirtschaft \| Barter economy

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.3982/TE1792 [DOI] hdl:10419/197133 [Handle]
Classification:	D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011744271