Efficient Horizontal Mergers in Polluting Industries with Cournot Competition

We investigate the feasibility of horizontal mergers in a homogeneous triopoly where firms compete in quantities and production is polluting the environment. We show that the degree of alignment between private and social incentives increases in the intensity of pollution.

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Year of publication:	2012-02
Authors:	Lambertini, L. ; Tampieri, A.
Institutions:	Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices ; Q51 - Valuation of Environmental Effects
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009647756