Enabling Triple Bottom Line Compliance Via Principal-Agent Incentive Mechanisms

A corporation that wants to fully embrace sustainability must address all three pillars of the triple bottom line. Among profit, planet, and people, it is this last category that is hardest to measure directly. When a company has remote locations and cannot directly observe effort, the compliance must be inferred from other metrics. We introduce a game-theoretic model to influence plant compliance to corporate goals

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Manikas, Andrew
Other Persons:	Godfrey, Michael (contributor)
Publisher:	[2011]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Corporate Social Responsibility \| Corporate social responsibility \| Nachhaltige Entwicklung \| Sustainable development \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (10 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Global Journal of Business Research, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 105-114 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments 2010 erstellt
Classification:	C02 - Mathematical Methods ; C61 - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis ; M10 - Business Administration. General ; O21 - Planning Models; Planning Policy
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10013123187