Endogenous managerial compensation contracts in experimental quantity-setting duopolies
Iván Barreda-Tarrazona, Nikolaos Georgantzís, Constantine Manasakis, Evangelos Mitrokostas, Emmanuel Petrakis
| Year of publication: |
April 2016
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Barreda Tarrazona, Iván J. ; Georgantzís, Nikolaos ; Manasakis, Constantine ; Mitrokostas, Evangelos ; Petrakēs, Emmanuēl |
| Published in: |
Economic modelling. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0264-9993, ZDB-ID 86824-3. - Vol. 54.2016, p. 205-217
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| Subject: | Experimental economics | Oligopoly theory | Managerial delegation | Endogenous contracts | Duopol | Duopoly | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Oligopol | Oligopoly | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Führungskräfte | Managers | Experiment | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Vertrag | Contract | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Experimentelle Ökonomik |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.econmod.2015.12.028 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10011642108