Endogenous timing of moves in an asymmetric price-setting duopoly

This paper adds to the growing literature on endogenous timing of decisions in duopolies. We show for a price-setting duopoly game with sufficiently asymmetric and strictly convex cost functions that the less efficient firm moves first while the more efficient moves second with a higher price than the less efficient firm.

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Year of publication:	2003
Authors:	Tasnádi, Attila
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Mathematics \| Econometrics

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Type of publication:	Article
Language:	English
Notes:	Tasnádi, Attila (2003) Endogenous timing of moves in an asymmetric price-setting duopoly. Portuguese Economic Journal, 2 (1). pp. 23-35. DOI 10.1007/s10258-002-0018-3 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10258-002-0018-3>
Source:	BASE

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