Entry in Regulated Monopoly Markets : The Development of a Competitive Fringe in the Local Telephone Industry

Incumbent firms operating in today's local telephone industry are beginning to face competition from new entrants. Using the dominant firm-competitive fringe framework and a recently constructed panel data set of local telephone markets, this paper provides an empirical analysis of the competitive transition underway in the United States local telephone industry. Of particular interest is the differential impact of economic regulation on the development of fringe competition in local telephone markets. Empirical results reveal that local telephone markets with price-cap regulation have witnessed less net fringe entry, and subsequently contain smaller competitive fringes during the time period studied. These findings imply that the widespread adoption of price-cap regulation by state public utility commissions has contributed to the slow development of local telephone competition. To reconcile this surprising conclusion, a political economy explanation detailing how state regulators have benefited from this regulatory decision is put forth and supported with empirical evidence