Epistemically stable strategy sets

Geir B. Asheim; Max Voorneveld; Jörgen W. Weibull

This paper provides a definition of epistemic stability of sets of strategy profiles, and uses it to characterize variants of curb sets in finite games, including the set of rationalizable strategies and minimal curb sets. -- Epistemic game theory ; epistemic stability ; rationalizability ; closedness under rational behavior ; mutual p-belief

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Asheim, Geir B. ; Voorneveld, Max ; Weibull, Jörgen W.
Publisher:	Oslo : Dep. of Economics, Univ. of Oslo
Subject:	Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Noncooperative game \| Rationalität \| Rationality \| Lernprozess \| Learning process \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory

Extent:	Online-Ressource (21 S.)
Series:	Memorandum / Department of Economics, University of Oslo. - Oslo : Department of Economics, University of Oslo, ISSN 0809-8786, ZDB-ID 2532549-8. - Vol. 2010,01
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/47340 [Handle]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003926287