Escalation of commitment and CEO departures : theory and evidence
Year of publication: |
2021
|
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Authors: | Chulkov, Dmitriy V. ; Barron, John M. |
Published in: |
Journal of business economics and management. - Vilnius : VTGU Publ. House "Technika", ISSN 2029-4433, ZDB-ID 2400520-4. - Vol. 22.2021, 6, p. 1416-1435
|
Subject: | escalation of commitment | discontinued operations | asymmetric information | principal-agent model | CEO turnover | labor economics | Führungskräfte | Managers | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Theorie | Theory | Arbeitsmobilität | Labour mobility | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.3846/jbem.2021.15532 [DOI] |
Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; G30 - Corporate Finance and Governance. General ; J63 - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs ; M12 - Personnel Management ; M50 - Personnel Economics. General |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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