Esquemas de incentivos y carteras de inversión innovadoras

This article characterizes the properties of the compensation scheme of delegated portfolio management that would lead to the selection of high risk-high return portfolios. In particular, it provides conditions under which a non-monotone payment structure emerges as an optimal contract, which rewards extreme results and punishes moderate ones.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Loyola, Gino ; Portilla, Yolanda
Published in:	Estudios de Economía. - Santiago de Chile : Universidad de Chile, Departamento de Economía, ISSN 0718-5286. - Vol. 37.2010, 1, p. 43-66
Publisher:	Santiago de Chile : Universidad de Chile, Departamento de Economía
Subject:	executive compensation \| delegated portfolio management \| nonmonotone incentive schemes \| non-monotone likelihood ratio property

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In libraries world-wide (WorldCat)

In German libraries (KVK)

subito order

I need help

More details

Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Article
Language:	Spanish
Other identifiers:	636476006 [GVK] hdl:10419/66714 [Handle]
Classification:	D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory ; G11 - Portfolio Choice ; G20 - Financial Institutions and Services. General ; G30 - Corporate Finance and Governance. General ; J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs)
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010289498