This thesis consists of studies in the field of experimental economics. The first two chapters of the thesis deal with the issue of subject selection in Cournot Oligopoly experiments. In particular, chapter 1 presents a study which was designed to test whether a predominant personality inventory (NEO-PI-R) can account for differences in behavior between subjects in a Cournot Duopoly with random matching. Chapter 2 investigates whether Malaysian managers behave differently than Malaysian students (and German students) in a Cournot Triopoly. Chapter 3 presents a study in the field of environmental economics that investigates whether the initial allocation of emission permits and the auction design affect the adoption of advanced technology in a market with many small asymmetric firms, particularly, when the regulator commits himself ex-ante to the level of permits. Chapter 4 provides a natural investigation of a market sharing certain features with the ultimatum bargaining game. The introduction of the Schleswig-Holstein ticket (S-H ticket) by the German train company created a market which is characterized by ‘proposers’ who offer to take ‘responders’ with their ticket for a specified price. A deadline imposed by the trains’ departure time on the bargainers transforms the situation into an ultimatum bargaining situation. Chapter 4 thoroughly describes this market, which we refer to as the Kiel market for budget travel by train. Finally, Appendix A presents a bootstrap approach to determine critical values for the dynamic quintile test as a common diagnostic tool for model based Value-at-Risk estimates.
