Essays on institutions and growth
There is an extensive and mostly empirical literature that identifies institutions as one of the main determinants of income per capita today. This literature has also documented a high persistence in the quality of these institutions, and has identified some general features influencing the way they were implemented. But less is known, especially at a theoretical level, about the specific channels trough which these institutions affect economic outcomes, and the particular way they were designed in the beginning. My dissertation contributes to the understanding of these issues. In Chapter 1, " Contracting Institutions and Economic Development ", I explore theoretically a specific mechanism trough which institutions that enforce private contracts affect income per capita. The model predicts that this effect depends on the level of economic development of a country, and it differs from the effect of institutions that ensure that the government is sufficiently constrained so it cannot engage in expropriation. Empirical evidence is used to validate the model predictions. Chapter 2, "The Risk of Civil Conflicts as a Determinant of Political Institutions ", focuses on political institutions and propose a particular determinant of their quality: the risk of internal conflicts. I present a theoretical model and empirical evidence to show that the lower is this risk, the better is the quality of these institutions. Finally Chapter 3, "Contract Enforcement, Financial Development and International Risk Sharing ", studies the effect of these institutions on macroeconomic fluctuations in financially open economies.
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|Authors:||Aguirre Rigorighi, Alvaro J|
|Type of publication:||Other|
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