This work contains two separate essays. The first essay, "International Patent Length Setting with Shelving Behavior" looks at government choices in patent lengths when invention of a basic technology is distinguished from invention of applications of that technology. The choice of patent length in each country is shown to depend on relative ability at "applied" vs. "basic" R&D. A country which is relatively superior at "applied" R&D will choose a shorter patent length than a country which is relatively superior at "basic" R&D. If one country can impose its own choice of patent length on another country, it will choose a length that closely resembles its own. When both countries choose to have a finite length patent, but are different in their relative abilities in K&D, a single global patent length will lie between those of the two countries. The second essay, "Equilibrium Dumping with Endogenous Anti-dumping Penalties," looks at anti-dumping law and its effects. In this paper, price discrimination is the basis for a margin of dumping. We use a Cournot duopoly model where profits are dependent on past and future margin of dumping. The model is used to investigate the observed phenomenon of a continuation of intercountry price differences in the face of uncertain anti-dumping penalties. A foreign firm is subject to an anti-dumping fine, where the probability of incurring the fine and the size of the fine are determined by the previous period's margin of dumping. In a non-cooperative infinitely repeated game the Markov Perfect Equilibrium can lead to a continuing margin of dumping. Anti-dumping laws that force price equalization, under these conditions are shown to be equivalent to an exclusion of the foreign firm from the market.
