Essential stability for large generalized games

We address the essential stability of Cournot-Nash equilibria for generalized games with a continuum of players, where only a finite number of them are atomic. Given any set of generalized games continuously parameterized by a complete metric space, we analyze the robustness of equilibria to perturbations on parameters.

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Year of publication:	2012-01
Authors:	Correa, Sofía ; Torres-Martínez, Juan Pablo
Institutions:	Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Subject:	Essential equilibria \| Essential sets and components \| Generalized games

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	MPRA Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009647259