Evasão fiscal sob estruturas comportamentais

We study the strategic interactions between the scal authority and the taxpayer regarding tax evasion and auditing. We t this interaction into a Bayesian game and introduce the concept of behavioral consistency, which helps reducing the number of available strategies and models the stylized fact according to which the choice to evade is subject to behavioral patterns.

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Year of publication:	2011-01
Authors:	Pantoja, Gabriela ; Peñaloza, Rodrigo
Institutions:	Departamento de Economia, Faculdade de Economia, Administração, Contabilidade e Ciência da Informação e Documentação (FACE)
Subject:	tax evasion \| Bayesian equilibrium \| behavioral consistency

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working papers - Textos para Discussao do Departamento de Economia da Universidade de Brasilia.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 346 22 pages
Classification:	H26 - Tax Evasion ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008787367