Evolutionary Dynamics and Backward Induction

The backward induction (or subgame-perfect) equilibrium of a perfect information game is shown to be the unique evolutionarily stable outcome for dynamic models consisting of selection and mutation, when the mutation rate is low and the populations are large.

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Year of publication:	1999-05-27
Authors:	Hart, Sergiu
Institutions:	EconWPA
Subject:	games in extensive form \| games of perfect information \| backward induction equilibrium \| subgame-perfect equilibrium \| evolutionary dynamics \| evolutionary stability \| mutation \| selection \| population games

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Extent:	application/pdf application/x-tex application/postscript
Series:	Game Theory and Information.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Type of Document - Scientific Word v2.5 (LaTeX); First
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making ; C6 - Mathematical Methods and Programming
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407617