Exchange and Optimality

A feasible social state is irreducible if and only if, for any non-trivial partition of individuals with two groups, there exists another feasible social state at which every individual in the first group is equally well-off and someone strictly better-off. Competitive equilibria decentralize irreducible Pareto optimal social states.

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Year of publication:	1996-09
Authors:	Ghosal, S. ; Polemarchakis, Heracles M.
Institutions:	Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University
Subject:	Social states \| optimality \| exchange

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Published in Economic Theory (April 1999), 13(3): 629-642 The price is None Number 1133 18 pages
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D60 - Welfare Economics. General ; D62 - Externalities
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593635