EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF EQUILIBRIUM IN ASYMMETRIC CONTESTS WITH ENDOGENOUS PRIZES

This paper considers contests in which the efforts of the players determine the value of the prize. Players may have different valuations of the prize and different abilities to convert expenditures to productive efforts. In addition, players may face different financial constraints. This paper presents a proof for the existence and uniqueness of a pure Nash equilibrium in asymmetric contests with endogenous prizes.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	HIRAI, SHUMEI ; SZIDAROVSZKY, FERENC
Published in:	International Game Theory Review (IGTR). - World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., ISSN 1793-6675. - Vol. 15.2013, 01, p. 1350005-1
Publisher:	World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Subject:	Contests \| endogenous prize \| existence and uniqueness \| Subject Classification: D72 \| Subject Classification: C72 \| Subject Classification: L13

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Extent:	application/pdf text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	B4 - Economic Methodology ; C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods. General ; C6 - Mathematical Methods and Programming ; C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium ; D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making ; M2 - Business Economics
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010662638