Existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in imperfectly discriminating contests

Cédric Wasser

We consider a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests with privately informed players. We show that findings by Athey (2001) imply the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone pure strategies.

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Wasser, Cédric
Publisher:	Mannheim [u.a.] : Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15
Subject:	contest \| imperfectly discriminating \| asymmetric information \| equilibrium existence \| interdependent values \| Wettbewerb \| Competition \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Noncooperative game \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Nash-Gleichgewicht \| Nash equilibrium \| Theorie \| Theory

Extent:	Online-Ressource (6 S., 134 KB)
Series:	Discussion papers / Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems. - Bonn : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ZDB-ID 2499250-1. - Vol. 331
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/93827 [Handle]
Classification:	D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008822063