Existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in imperfectly discriminating contests

We consider a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests with privately informed players. We show that findings by Athey (2001) imply the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone pure strategies.

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Wasser, Cédric
Publisher:	München : Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Subject:	Wettbewerb \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Asymmetrische Information \| Nash-Gleichgewicht \| Theorie \| contest \| imperfectly discriminating \| asymmetric information \| equilibrium existence \| interdependent values

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Series:	SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; 331
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.5282/ubm/epub.13223 [DOI] 645279358 [GVK] hdl:10419/93827 [Handle] RePEc:trf:wpaper:331 [RePEc]
Classification:	D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333804