Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions

We show the existence of a pure strategy, symmetric, increasing equilibrium in dou- ble auction markets with correlated, conditionally independent private values and many participants. The equilibrium we ï¬nd is arbitrarily close to fully revealing as the market size grows. Our results provide strategic foundations for price-taking behavior in large markets.

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Year of publication:	2007
Authors:	Fudenberg, Drew ; Mobius, Markus ; Szeidl, Adam
Institutions:	Department of Economics, Harvard University

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Scholarly Articles.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Published in Journal of Economic Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010549926