Exploring the Effects of Unequal and Secretive Pay

We experimentally test whether intentional and observable discriminatorypay of symmetric agents in the Winter (2004) game causes lowpaid agents to reduce effort. We control for intentionality of wages byeither allowing a principal to determine wages or by implementing arandom process. Our main observations are that discrimination hasno negative effect on efforts and principals do not shy away from usingdiscriminatory pay if it is observable.[...]

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Fischer, Sven Heiko ; Steiger, Eva-Maria
Institutions:	Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung Strategische Interaktion
Subject:	Zahlung \| Studie \| Lohndifferenzierung \| Gegenseitigkeit \| reciprocity \| Neid \| envy

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1 Introduction
2 Model
3 Experiment
3.1 Design & Treatments
4 Results
4.1 Wage Offers
4.2 Effort Choices - Descriptive Analysis
4.3 Effort Choices - Regression Analysis
4.4 Beliefs
4.5 Further Results
5 Conclusions
References

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009022163