Export Restraints and Horizontal Product Differentiation

We consider the effects of export restraints on price competition in the Hotelling model of horizontal differentiation. We characterize the Nash equilibrium for all possible values of the quota and compare our results with those of Krishna (89). We show that a foreign producer would choose a VER in the vicinity of the Free Trade Equilibrium. In order to maximize domestic welfare, a government would necessarily choose complete protectionism nor Free Trade.

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Year of publication:	1997-01-01
Authors:	Boccard, N. ; Wauthy, Xavier
Institutions:	Institut de Recherche Économique et Sociale (IRES), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain
Subject:	Hotelling \| optimal quota \| price competition

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales).
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	The text is part of a series UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) Number 1997024 1 pages long
Classification:	D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; F13 - Commercial Policy; Protection; Promotion; Trade Negotiations ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004985287