Fair Salaries and the Moral Costs of Corruption

In a bribery experiment, we test the hypothesis that distributive fairness considerations make relatively well-paid public officials less corruptible. Corrupt decisions impose damages to workers whose wage is varied in two treatments. However, there is no apparent difference in behaviour.

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Year of publication:	2000
Authors:	Abbink, Klaus
Publisher:	Bonn : University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
Subject:	Corruption \| reciprocity \| fairness \| public sector salaries

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Series:	Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; 1/2000
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	869367250 [GVK] hdl:10419/78377 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:bonedp:12000 [RePEc]
Classification:	C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; D62 - Externalities ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D73 - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption ; K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317635