Faulty Communication

The electronic mail game of Rubinstein (1989) showed that a lack of common knowledge generated by faulty communication can make coordinated action impossible. This paper shows how this conclusion is robust to having a more realistic timing structure of messages, more than two players who meet publicly but not as a plenary group, and may be robust to strategic decisions about whether to communicate.

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Year of publication:	2000-08
Authors:	Morris, Stephen
Institutions:	Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University
Subject:	Electronic mail \| common knowledge \| coordination

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	CFP 1126 Published in Advances in Theoretical Economics (2001), 1(1): 1-23 The price is None Number 1271R 22 pages
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D8 - Information and Uncertainty
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004990808