Faulty Communication: Some Variations on the Electronic Mail Game

The electronic mail game of Rubinstein (1989) showed that a lack of common knowledge generated by faulty communication can make coordinated action impossible. This paper shows how this conclusion is robust to having a more realistic timing structure of messages, more than two players who meet publicly but not as a plenary group, and may be robust to strategic decisions about whether to communicate.

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Year of publication:	2002
Authors:	Morris, Stephen
Published in:	Advances in Theoretical Economics. - Berkeley Electronic Press. - Vol. 1.2002, 1, p. 1027-1027
Publisher:	Berkeley Electronic Press
Subject:	common knowledge \| communication \| coordination

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	oai:bepress:bejte-1027
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005751126