Feedback and Incentives : Experimental Evidence

This paper experimentally investigates the impact of different pay and relative performance information policies on employee effort. We explore three information policies: No feedback about relative performance, feedback given halfway through the production period, and continuously updated feedback...

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Year of publication:	2008-04-01
Authors:	Eriksson, Tor ; Poulsen, Anders ; Villeval, Marie-Claire
Institutions:	Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit <Bonn>
Subject:	Wettbewerb \| market microstructure \| Leistungslohn \| Akkordlohn \| piece rate

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Extent:	860160 bytes 42 p. application/pdf
Series:	Universität Bonn - Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA) - Discussion Papers in 2008 Discussion Paper ; 3440 (2008)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; J16 - Economics of Gender ; J24 - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity ; J31 - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials by Skill, Training, Occupation, etc ; J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs) ; Pay salaries and social benefits ; Individual Working Papers, Preprints ; No country specification
Source:	USB Cologne (business full texts)

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005860221