Feedback in Tournaments under Commitment Problems:Theory and Experimental Evidence

In this paper, we analyze a principal's optimal feedback policy in tournaments. We close agap in the literature by assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy atthe beginning of the tournament...

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Year of publication:	2007-10-01
Authors:	Gürtler, Oliver ; Harbring, Christine
Institutions:	Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit <Bonn>
Subject:	Problem \| Bildung \| learning

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Extent:	525312 bytes 40 p. application/pdf
Series:	IZA - Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit - Discussion Papers IZA Discussion Paper ; No. 3111 (2007)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge ; J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs) ; Personnel administration. Human resources management. General ; Individual Working Papers, Preprints ; No country specification
Source:	USB Cologne (business full texts)

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005861537