Fictitious Play in Coordination Games

We study the Fictitious Play process with bounded and unbounded recall in pure coordination games for which failing to coordinate yields a payoff of zero for both players. It is shown that every Fictitious Play player with bounded recall may fail to coordinate against his own type. On the other hand, players with unbounded recall are shown to coordinae (almost surely) against their own type as well as against players with bounded recall. This implies that a FP players's realized average utility is (almost surely) at least as large as his minmax payoffs in 2x2 coordination games.

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Authors:	Sela, Aner ; Herreiner, Dorothea K.
Institutions:	University of Bonn, Germany
Subject:	Learning \| Fictitious Play \| Coordination Games \| Pure Coordination Games

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Extent:	application/pdf application/postscript
Series:	Discussion Paper Serie B.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968208