Fictitious play in `one-against-all' multi-player games

A compound game is an (n + 1) player game based on n two-person subgames. In each of these subgames player 0 plays against one of the other players. Player 0 is regulated, so that he must choose the same strategy in all n subgames. We show that every fictitious play process approaches the set of equilibria in compound games for which all subgames are either zero-sum games, potential games, or $2\times 2$ games.

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Year of publication:	1999-10-14
Authors:	Sela, Aner
Published in:	Economic Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 14.1999, 3, p. 635-651
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Learning \| Fictitious play \| Zero-sum games \| Potential games

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	Received: July 18, 1997; revised version: December 4, 1998
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005753121